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This Thesis develops a configuration management approach for use
during the operational phase of the NATO SEASPARROW Surface Missile
System project. A brief description of the concepts and techniques of
configuration management as well as the background of the NATO
SEASPARROW project are presented to familiarize the reader with the
subject matter.
The sub-alternatives and constraints in the areas of organizational
form, authority constraints, and change control measures are enumerated
and evaluated against the goals of the members of the consortium and
the requirements of sound configuration management. System alternatives
and constraints are then synthesized from the sets of sub-alternatives
to provide a final set of cohesive, viable alternatives.
From an evaluation of these system alternatives, the recommended
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The purpose of this thesis is to present a development of alterna-
tive approaches to the configuration management issues surrounding
the NATO SEASPARROW Surface Missile System during the system's
operational phase. From these alternatives a recommended approach
to the configuration management question will be presented.
B. BACKGROUND
The NATO SEASPARROW Project is a NATO (NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY
ORGANIZATION) sponsored multinational consortium. The member nations
have formed this consortium for the express purpose of designing,
developing, and producing a shipboard, point-defense, surface-to-air
missile system utilizing the existing United States SPARROW air-to-air
missile.
Configuration management is the management of change. It provides
the method for orderly and effective management of system design con-
figuration through control of plans and specifications, and for control
of hardware configuration through a regulated system of change review,
approval, and implementation. Configuration management is relatively
new as a distinct management discipline with practices reflecting
formalized configuration management first appearing in the early 1950's.
Engoron, Edward J. and Jackson, Albert L., Jr., "Uniform Policy
and Guidance Established for Configuration Management," Defense
Industrial Bulletin
, p. 1 v. 5, no. 1 January 1969.
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Before 1962 these configuration management procedures were restricted
to "controlling changes to production hardware via the approval of
2
engineering change proposals."
The role of configuration management in the world of complex weapon
systems is emphasized when the dynamic nature of these systems is
observed. The re-designs, changes, and modifications that occur to a
system as it evolves through its life cycle, from concept development
to operational use, are normally numerous and extensive. To provide
for proper logistic support maintenance, design modifications, and re-
procurement actions, the changes to a system must be effectively
3
controlled and recorded. This thesis addresses the configuration
management function during the operational phase, the time span from
system delivery to the user until obsolescence, of one specific system.
The concepts discussed will, however, have a certain degree of common-
alty with other multinational endeavors concerning configuration mana-
gement. For definitions of terms used in this thesis, which are
peculiar to the fields of configuration management and systems
acquisition, the reader is referred to the glossary in Appendix A.
C. APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM
The approach used to achieve the objective of this thesis is to
develop sets of sub-alternatives and constraints which are discussed in
detail. From these sub-alternatives and constraints, three alternative
2
Samaras, Thomas T. , and Czerwinski , Frank L., Fundamentals of






system approaches are synthesized, evaluated against the objectives of
the plan, and the recommended approach is selected.
D. SYNOPSIS OF THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter II provides a comprehensive look at the concepts and current
practices of configuration management in general , together with specific
interpretations and applications in the United State Navy. Basic
Department of Defense and United States Navy configuration management
documents as well as those affecting the NATO SEASPARROW Project are
reviewed.
The background of the NATO SEASPARROW Project is described in
Chapter III. The management organization is discussed in detail, as
is the existing configuration management plan being used during the
development and production phases. It. is the intent of the authors to
provide a basis for understanding of the unique environment which
surrounds this particular configuration management application. After
reviewing the project history with appropriate emphasis on the con-
figuration management aspects, the chapter concludes by summarizing
the current status of the project.
The statement of problem, expressed in terms of the objectives of
the nations forming the NATO SEASPARROW consortium is presented in
Chapter IV.
Chapter V is a development and discussion of the objectives to be
attained by the configuration management approach proposed by this thesis.
Chapter VI delineates and discusses the advantages and disadvantages
of the sub-alternatives and constraints in the categories or organizational
form, authority constraints, change control measures, and actual
administration of the configuration management system.
13

In Chapter VII, three configuration management system alternative
approaches are developed for use during the operational phase of the
project. The alternatives are evaluated against the objectives developed
in Chapter V and a recommended configuration management approach is
selected.
In Chapter VIII, an implementation plan is presented for the
selected alternative. The organization, flow of change proposals, and




II. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT - AN OVERVIEW
As noted in the introduction, configuration management, as a distinct
management discipline, is of relatively recent origin. The basic func-
tions of configuration management, however, are not new. These basic
functions may be categorized as identifying and documenting changes as
they occur, facilitating the control of changes, and maintaining the
4
status of change actions.
A. THE NEED FOR CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
The functions of configuration management have long been performed
5
in the development and production of weapon systems. It has always
been necessary for the contractor to know how a product was configured
so that it could be duplicated in production and for the customer to
know how it was configured so he could be sure that he was getting
what he contracted for, could support it logistically and could evaluate
the potential impact of changes. While this concept of configuration
management is generally valid after a system enters production and
becomes operational, the present day concept of configuration management
is much more encompassing. Currently, configuration management in the
Department of Defense is concerned with a system throughout its entire
life cycle, which covers the time span as a system evolves from concept
formulation to engineering development, then into production, and
4
Engoron, and Jackson, "Uniform Policy and Guidance Established
for Configuration Management," Defense Industrial Bulletin
, p. 1
5





finally on to the operation phase. Section C of this chapter gives a
description of the system life cycle.
As a system evolves through the life cycle, its physical and
functional characteristics also evolve. Changes are continually being
made to achieve the desired or improved performance of the components,
to correct deficiencies in the system design, to reduce cost and weight
of equipments, to improve system effectiveness, and to update specifica-
tions. Change is a necessary and vital fact of life for ewery system.
It is assumed by the authors that for small systems the number of changes
are normally small, that the complexity is not great and that these
changes can be easily managed. When systems become significantly larger
the changes increase in number and in complexity. As this occurrs
,
change must be managed or chaos will result. The discipline of con-
figuration management, as it is known today, has been developed to manage
the evolution of change in a system during its life cycle.
B. DEFINITION OF CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Configuration management, as defined by NAVMAT Instruction 4130.1, is,
"a discipline applying technical and adminstrative direction
and surveillance to (1) properly identify functional and
physical characteristics of an item, (2) control identifica-
tion and changes to the characteristics, and (3) record change
processing and implementation status throughout the life






NAVMAT Instruction 4130.1, Configuration Management, A Policy
and Guidance Manual
, p. 1-1 Department of the Navy Headquarters Navrl
Material Command, Washington, D.C. September 14, 1967.
16

Samaras and Czerwinski base their definition of configuration mana-
gement on their concept of "progressive definitization" which states
that,
"the configuration of a product is derived during development,
determined during design, established during production and
maintained during operational support. "9
Their definition of configuration management is,
"the art of organizing and controlling planning, design,
development and hardware operations by means of uniform
configuration control, identification and accounting of
a product. "1°
Figure 1 shows the major facets and interfaces of configuration
management.
C. THE SYSTEM LIFE CYCLE
The system life cycle is the idealized step-by-step evolutionary
process through which any major system should flow. This cycle has
been formalized by the Department of Defense in a series of phases or
efforts. Figure 2 depicts the life cycle phases as currently defined
in a RDT&E pamphlet.
11
During the conceptual phase the military, technical and economic
bases for an acquisition program are established. This phase includes
threat and mission analysis as well as evaluation of the technical
feasibility, cost estimates, schedule feasibility, and risk and trade-
off analysis of the proposed project. The result of this phase
9
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includes cost, schedule, and operational parameters which have been
evaluated and approved.
The validation phase develops, through extensive analysis and some
hareware development, the major program characteristics including the
technical aspects, cost, and schedule and further validates the
operational need of the project.
During the full scale development effort, the system hardware and
all necessary items for its support, including training equipment
support equipment, operational and maintenance manuals are designed,
fabricated, and tested. The result of this effort is a hardware model
(prototype) of the system components and the documentation needed to
produce the system and to facilitate support.
The production phase includes the production of the system, its
training equipment, spares and associated equipments as well as the
actual deployment of the system to operational units.
D. PRINCIPAL CONCEPTS AND OBJECTIVES OF CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT
Common to both the official Department of Defense and the Samaras
and Czerwinski definitions of configuration management are the concepts
of control, status accounting, and identification. These three concepts,
and their related objectives, are essential to configuration management.
1 . Configuration Control
Configuration control consists of the systematic procedures by
which configuration changes are proposed, evaluated, coordinated and
approved for incorporation. Its objective is to insure the smooth




approval and implementation. Briefly, an engineering change proposal
is a document which proposes a change to a configuration item in accord-
ance with applicable instructions. It includes such items as a descrip-
tion of the change, its justification, and the effect the change is
13
estimated to have on schedule. A configuration item is a component
which satisfies an end use function and is designated as a configuration
item by the government. During development and initial production,
configuration items are only those specification items directly refer-
enced in a contract. During operational use, any repairable item
14designated for separate procurement is a configuration item.
2. Configuration Status Accounting
Configuration status accounting, the second conept, is the book-
keeping process which records the configuration item configuration at a
baseline and all changes made from that baseline as the system evolves
toward the next baseline. Briefly, a baseline is a reference configura-
tion established at a specified point in the system life cycle. Base-
line management is more fully explained in Section E of this chapter.
The objective of configuration status accounting is to provide the user
with accurate, up-to-date information on the configuration status of
all configuration items entering operational status. The configuration
12




Department of Defense Military Standard MIL-STD-480 Configuration
Control Engineering Changes , Deviations and Waivers, p. 15.
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status accounting technique establishes a record system which enables
the user to determine (1) where a product is located or installed, (2)




Configuration identification, the third concept, is embodied in
the technical drawings, publications and related documents that describe
the configuration item at each baseline of its development. The objec-
tive of configuration identification includes the accumulation and
correlation of the approved technical, descriptive documentation required
for engineering development, fabrication, test acceptance, operation,
maintenance, and logistic support of a weapon system. The establishment
and maintenance of the precise identity of each element throughout the
system life cycle is facilitated by the use of standardized Department
1 c
of Defense identification methods. A principal tool utilized in
establishing configuration identification is the configuration audit.
The audit is used at predetermined points in the life cycle to verify
such items as the design specifications, drawings, and manuals against
the physical item to insure their congruence.
E. BASELINE MANAGEMENT
The primary vehicle used to achieve configuration management is
the concept of baseline management. A baseline is a reference point
15
Samaras and Czerwinski , Fundamentals of Configuration Management
,
p. 13.
TR-133 Configuration Management Handbook
,
p. 3-1 Naval Ship




which serves as a point of departure for new effort or change. Config-
uration baselines describe the physical and functional characteristics
of the system at specific points in time. When baselines are supplemented
with the documentation of all changes made up to any point in time sub-
sequent to that baseline, the exact configuration of the item can be
established for that point in time. Figure 2 compares the life cycle






The first baseline established is the operational requirements
18
baseline. This baseline is required only on "major" warfare or support
area systems. It consists of a general identification of the capabilities
needed, information on the operational concept that could lead to
intelligent evaluation of trade-offs and alternatives, and the relation-
ships between the needed capabilities and those of other Navy agencies.
The source of this information is the General Operational Requirement
or Tentative Specific Operational Requirement. The reader is refered
to the glossary for the definition of these information sources.
2. Functional Baseline
The functional baseline is mandatory for all Navy material
requirements. This baseline serves throughout the system life cycle as
NAVMAT Instruction 4130.1, Configuration Management, A Policy
and Guidance Manual .
18




Office of the Director of Defense Research and
Engineering, Washington, D.C. pp. 34-41, November 1971.
19
NAVMAT Instruction 4130.1, Configuration Management A Policy
and Guidance Manual , 1 1 1-9
23

a description of the system's required functional characteristics,
description, operational concept, performance constraints, compatibility
criteria, related Department of Defense requirements, performance inter-
face, and key configuration elements. The source for the information in




The allocated baseline is also optional and may be required due
to the complexity of an item at its lower level work breakdown structure.
When used, this baseline governs the development of selected configura-
21
tion items that are a part of a higher level item.
4. Product Basel ine
The product baseline is a mandatory Navy requirement. This
baseline prescribes the necessary "build to", or form, fit, and function
requirements for a configuration item and the acceptance test for those
requirements. The product baseline identifies the current system
specification, the current specification tree, the master configuration
listing, the functional/physical configuration descriptions, the physical
and functional interfaces, the configuration audit results, and associated
changes and revisions. The reader is referred to the glossary for
definitions of these terms. The sources are vast and include the
specifications, drawings, parts lists, audit reviews, contract change
proposals, configuration control board reports, and logistic support
22











review authority which evaluates engineering change proposals and
approves them for adoption.
5. Operational Support Baseline
The final baseline is the operational support baseline which is
an extension in time of the product baseline. It is normally developed
for Navy items for which prior baselines were not established due to
the items not having been developed specifically for the Navy. Such
items are normally off-the-shelf type items utilized in industry and
commerce. This baseline may also be desired when there has been a
substantial change in the product baseline after a number of years in
23
service.
F. CONFUTATION MANAGEMENT DOCUMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES NAVY
The present configuration management program was established in the
Navy in V968 with the issuance of Department of Defense Directive 5010.10,
"Configuration Management" and Department of Defense Instruction 5010.21
"Configuration Management Implementation Guidance," These documents
defined the scope of configuration management and criteria which had
been established and were supported by a group of new Military Standards
(MIL-STD). '
1. MIL-STD-480
The primary configuration management document is MIL-STD-480.
This document provides:
"(a) requirements for maintaining configuration control of
configuration items.
(b) requirements for the preparation and submission of





(c) requirements for submitting the technical, fiscal and
logistic supporting information necessary to define the
impact of a proposed engineering change.
(d) instructions for submitting the information necessary
to maintain the configuration identification in a
current status. "24
MIL-STD-480 also categorizes the types of engineering change proposals
into two classes. A Class I engineering change is described as an
engineering change which affects the functional or allocated baselines,
the product configuration baseline as contractually specified, or the
technical requirements contained in the product baseline. A change is
also considered a Class I change if it affects contract fee, incentives,
cost schedules and guarantees on deliveries, government furnished
equipment, safety, test programs, support equipment compatibilities
retrofits, interchangeability , or electromagnetic characteristics. An
engineering change which does not fall within the definition of a Class
I change is considered a Class II change. The change criteria, which
specify the justification for change, are also delineated in MIL-STD-480.
MIL-STD-481 performs the same function. as MIL-STD-480 for con-
tracts involving the procurement of multi -application items or items
for which the prescribed detail design was not developed by the
contractor.
2. MIL-STD-482
To assure the use of uniform status accounting management
information throughout the Department of Defense and defense industry,
MIL-STD-482 prescribes the standard status accounting data elements to be
used on all Department of Defense contracts.
24
MIL-STD-480, Configuration Control - Engineering Changes, Devi a-
tions and Waivers
,




3. NAVMAT Instruction 4130.1
NAVMAT Instruction 4130.1 implements current policy issued from
25
the Department of Defense as well as reflecting Navy policy and guidance.
This manual defines the policy, relationships, responsibilities, and
procedures to be used in configuration management throughout the Navy.
• 4. NAVORD Instruction 4130.10
NAVORD Instruction 4130.10 establishes the NAVORD configuration
control board and states the policy, authority, and procedures for the
functioning of the board. A single configuration control board has
been established within NAVORD for review and approval of all Class I
engineering change proposals affecting systems within NAVORD cognizance.
Figure 3 shows the functional flow of an engineering change proposal
through the NAVORD configuration control board. This flow is prescribed
in order to insure the thorough evaluation of all engineering change
proposals as to their impact on performance, cost and schedule.
25
NAVMAT Instruction 4130.1, Configuration Management - A Policy
and Guidance Manual
,
Department of the Navy Headquarters Naval Material
Command, 14 September 1967
NAVORD Instruction 4130.10, "Naval Ordnance Systems Command
Configuration Control Board; establishment of," Naval Ordnance






A. ORIGIN OF THE NATO SEASPARROW PROJECT
In 1966 the NATO Naval Armaments Group approved a United States
proposal that NATO develop a lightweight surface-to-air missile system
for small warships. The system was to be designed to accommodate the
existing United States SPARROW air-to-air missile and to be designated
the "NATO SEASPARROW SURFACE MISSILE SYSTEM (NSSMS)."
A planning group was established which included members from France,
Italy, Norway and the United States; observers from Canada, the Federal
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands; and an unofficial observer from
Denmark. The chairman of the planning group was from the United States.
The first meeting of the planning group in early 1967 produced pre-
liminary agreement on the nature of the threat, the cost-sharing formula
and management approach, and partial agreement on the technical approach.
The starting point for the technical approach was the SPARROW air-
to-air missile (AIM-7E). The SPARROW missile is a relatively lightweight,
short-range, and highly accurate weapon, utilizing semi-active radar
homing guidance with an all-weather capability. To further enhance its
appeal, it was the least expensive guided missile in production with the
desired attributes. Figure 4, illustrates the components and inter-
faces for a NATO SEASPARROW Surface Missile Systems, single direction
system.
The use of the SPARROW missile against the threat established by
the consortium required the development of a shipboard launcher and





























service stowage, aiming and firing them in a short interval, and guiding
them to the point target. Lightness of weight, low cost, ease of
installation, and small crew size were all desired to be consistent with
the system's ability to cope with the specified threat and to permit
installation on a wide variety of naval ships.
At this point of the technical development, the first major con-
figuration change was proposed. All of the member nations, with the
exception of the United States, desired a modification to the warm-up
time required by the SPARROW Missile. A modification to the missile
was proposed which would reduce the warm-up time. The United States
Navy considered the modification to be an unnecessary addition to
missile cost and complexity; but, in the face of a strong stand by the
other nations, it yielded the point in order to avoid a stalemate. The
occurrence and handling of this situation is an example of the nature
of the configuration management problem facing the project throughout its
existence.
B. THE RAYTHEON APPROACH
Concurrent with the development of the NATO SEASPARROW System, the
United States was developing a similar system called the Advanced Point
Defense System which also utilized the SPARROW Missile. The Raytheon
Company, the development contractor for both the SPARROW Missile and the
Advanced Point Defense System, was also involved with the development
of .the technical approach for the NATO SEASPARROW Project. Through the
adoption of the "Raytheon approach" to the system description, the Raytheon
Company had gained unofficial recognition as the likely prime contractor
for the NATO SEASPARROW system development.
31

In early 1968, a Memorandum of Understanding was agreed upon by
the planning group and was submitted to the member nations for their
governments approval. At this time, France withdrew from the project
and Denmark asked to join as a full-fledged member. The Raytheon
Company was selected for the contract definition phase and as the prime
development contractor.
C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MANAGEMENT PLAN
In mid-June 1968, the NATO SEASPARROW Project Office (NSPO) was
activated, and in July the first meeting of the NATO SEASPARROW Project
Steering Committee (NSPSC) was held. The NATO SEASPARROW Project Office
and the NATO SEASPARROW Project Steering Committee were provided for in
the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) as follows:
"Control, coordinate, and monitor through the NATO SEASPARROW
Project Office, all aspects of the cooperative efforts of
the participating governments involved in the planning,
development and production of the NSSMS."27
The Memorandum of Understanding divides the project into two basic
stages: the development stage and the production stage. The break
between the stages is to be determined by the steering committee as the
system progresses.
The NATO SEASPARROW Project Steering Committee is composed of one
member from each of the participating governments. Each member of the
steering committee is responsible for the coordination necessary with
the appropriate authorities of his own country.
The NATO SEASPARROW Project Steering Committee is chartered to meet
at least once every three months and holds additional meetings as request
by any member. The chairman is selected yearly by the members.
27




Decisions of the NATO SEASPARROW Project Steering Committee must
be made by unanimous vote on the following subjects:
1. Decisions calling for approval of total cost estimates of the
development stage.
2. Decisions calling for approval of prime development contract
and prime directed production contract and changes thereto.
3. Decisions calling for approval of major schedule changes.
4. Decisions calling for approval of fundamental configuration and
configuration changes of the NATO SEASPARROW Surface Missile
System and sub-systems as set forth in the NATO SEASPARROW
performance and compatability requirements.
When timely agreement cannot be reached, the matter is referred by
each member without delay to his higher government authority. All
other decision of the steering committee are made by the vote of all
members, the vote of each member being weighed in proportion to the
financial share of the member's country in the cooperative project.
The NATO SEASPARROW Project Steering Committee is also responsible for
28
issuing such instructions, consistent with the Memorandum of Understanding,
as might be required for system management.
The NATO SEASPARROW Project Office (NSPO), which serves as the
executive staff of the NATO SEASPARROW Project Steering Committee is
established in Washington, D.C. The staff is headed by a Project Manager
who is designated by the United States. Each participating government
furnishes staff personnel for the NATO SEASPARROW Project Office in
approximately the same proportion as the financial share of its government.
oo




The organization, mode of operation, duties, and responsibilities of
the project office are established by the NATO SEASPARROW Project
Steering Committee. The project manager is responsible for the manage-
ment of the activities of the project office, consistent with the
assignments and directions of the steering committee and with the
Memorandum of Understanding.
D. SELECTION OF THE PRIME CONTRACTOR
During the contract definition phase, it became apparent to the
29
steering committee that a competitive approach to contracting for the
NATO SEASPARROW System would be required to bring about an acceptable
proposal. During this period there developed a rapport among the
representatives of the member nations which opened lines of communica-
tions and established mutual respects which have prevailed throughout
the project.
The Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Engineering Development (ED)
phase of the project was prepared and reviewed. within the United States
Naval Ordnance Systems Command to expedite the completion of the final
document.
Upon evaluation of the three bids received the engineering develop-
ment contract was awarded to the Equipment Systems Division of the
Raytheon Company. The contract called for the production of three
prototype models, plus a production run to be released upon successful
completion of tests on the prototypes.
29
"NATO SEASPARROW Project Office, History of the NATO SEASPARRO'
Surface Missile System, September 1970, p. I 1-8.
34

E. PRESENT STATUS OF THE PROJECT
In late 1969, the government of the Netherlands indicated that it
desired to join the NATO SEASPARROW Surface Missile System consortium.
In early 1970, the Royal Canadian Navy indicated a desire to purchase
certain components of the NATO SEASPARROW Surface Missile System but
did not desire to join the consortium as a full-fledged member. The
steering committee developed acceptable arrangements for each of these
nations, and in February of 1970 the requests were approved. This
action brought the project membership to its present status which
30
includes the United States, Norway, Belgium, Italy, Denmark and
The Netherlands as full fledged members. In addition, Canada is
purchasing individual system components without being a full member.
In March 1972, the first SEASPARROW system was installed on the
USS DOWNS, DE-1043.
F. CONFIGURATION MANAGEMENT BACKGROUND OF THE NATO SEASPARROW PROJECT
The configuration management plan developed for use during the
design, development, and production phases of the NATO SEASPARROW
Project is set forth in Section "K" of the contract between the
project and the Equipment Systems Division of Raytheon Company.
This plan utilizes the format presented in MIL-STD-480 for all
engineering change proposals. The approval authority for engineering
changes proposals has been subdivided between Class I and Class II changes,
the engineering change proposals area of impact, and the phase of
development or production. Each of these areas has been assigned to
30





either the contractor, the NATO SEASPARROW Project Office or the NATO
SEASPARROW Project Steering Committee for final approval authority.
This distribution is illustrated in Table I.
All engineering change proposals (Class I and II) are forwarded to
the Defense Contract Audit Agency representative by the prime contractor.
The Defense Contractor Audit Agency representative then forwards those
engineering change proposals to the NATO SEASPARROW Project Office where
contractor approved engineering change proposals are recorded, decisions
are made on those within the cognizance of the project office, and those
requiring steering committee action are reviewed and forwarded to the
member nations for consideration at the next meeting of the steering
committee.
All such changes received by the United States representatives are
then processed through the standard NAVORD engineering change proposal
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IV. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
A. NATIONAL OBJECTIVES
There are certain national objectives implicit in the forming of a
multinational consortium such as the NATO SEASPARROW Project. These
objectives, briefly stated, are:
1) to Obtain a shopisticated weapon system which an individual
nation might not have the technical, fiscal, and/or
managerial resources to produce individually.
2) to improve the national technological base by designing
and producing some of the major sub-systems with its own
industry.
3) to reduce the foreign exchange cost of purchasing a similar
system outright.
4) to obtain a standardized weapon to facilitate logistic
support and employment tactics.
31
5) to promote the integration of European industry.
B. NATURE OF NATO MULTINATIONAL PROJECTS.
As will be discussed further in Chapter VI, most NATO projects have
previously been thought of as ad hoc efforts, efforts created for the
sole purpose of purchasing or developing, and subsequently producing a
specific system. It has become apparent that continuing responsibility
in the area of logistic support is necessary to insure the operational
31
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success of the system. The support costs of such systems can be
large as exemplified by the NATO HAWK, Missile System which experienced
yearly logistic support cost of one-tenth its original purchase price,
plus a modernization program at the end of ten years of operation the
cost of which equaled the original purchase price. Thus, during a ten
33
year period; ownership cost was double the original purchase price.
C. SOURCES OF LOGISTIC SUPPORT
The supply source for spare parts in most systems is the producing
contractor. In the case of the NATO SEASPARROW however, the separate
sub-systems have been manufactured by sub-contractors located in each
of the member nations. This arrangement was intended primarily to reduce
the effect of the project on the balance of payments of the member
countries during the production phase. The impact of this arrangement
during the operational phase will be a degree of built-in interdependence
among the member nations for support parts. In order to meet this
problem, and situations similar to it arising from other NATO projects,
NATO has established a supply agency. However, this agency must still
rely on the original producers for parts.
D. SUMMARY OF THE PROBLEM
Essential to the idea of maintaining effective logistic support on
a system-wide basis are the fundamental concepts of configuration mana-
gement. Effective configuration management will reduce the number
32
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of different configurations and through the mechanism of configuration
status accounting enable logistics planners to more accurately plan for
system needs.
It is the authors' contention that member nations should continue
active participation in the project further into the system life-cycle,
satisfying objectives similar to those which brought the consortium
together and deriving the benefits of system configuration management.
The problem, then, is to develop a plan which will provide the mechanism
for this continued participation, while being acceptable to all member
nations. The objectives for such a configuration management plan are





It is assumed that, the dynamic nature of the configuration of a
deployed missile system requires the implementation of some form of
Configuration Management. It is the common consensus among those
involved in Configuration Management that given a sysetm with a high
degree of complexity containing numerous components or sub-systems,
changes are a fact of life. It should not be inferred by this remark
that changes are undesirable. Changes are a necessity to correct
production design and fabrication discrepancies, and, later in the life
cycle, to make added improvements in the system's performance, reliability,
maintainability, or availability. This leads to a major underlying
assumption of the authors that configuration management efforts for the
NATO SEASPARROW will not be termined after production but will be
continued in some form through the operational phase.
Given this underlying assumption, it is a realistic extension to
make provisions for a configuration management plan covering this phase.
This chapter sets forth the objectives for such a plan.
B. SYSTEM-WIDE IMPLEMENTATION OF CHANGE.
The first plan objective, and the three that follow it, are all
concerned with the function of configuration control. The thrust of the
first objective is directed at the ability of the configuration manage-
ment organization to implement approved changes on a system-wide basis.
The number of participants, while not large, adds complexily to this
problem. The plan must make adequate provision for the multinatior^
41

nature of the project and maintain uniform or differing approved con-
figurations through implementation of changes to all SEASPARROW
systems. The emphasis placed by the authors here is intended to be
on the full range of all systems, not on the procurement, distribution,
and installation details relating to a specific change, which is
addressed in objective 4. Stated in brief, objective one is as
follows:
1. The plan shall provide for implementation of approved
changes on a system-wide basis.
C. FLEXIBILITY AND EFFICIENCY
The authors feel that the plan should be designed to be flexible
and not require substantial revision or modification for each different
situation which might arise. The amount of administrative effort
related to each change should not be excessive; duplication of effort
should be kept to an absolute minimum, and eliminated entirely, if
possible. Changes should be processed without undue delay. Without
compromising the other objectives, the organization should maintain a
degree of flexibility and should handle changes in an efficient manner.
Formally stated, objective two follows:
2. The plan shall be flexible enough to respond to
differing situations and to implement changes
without undue administrative delay.
D. REVIEW AND APPROVAL MECHANISM
A unique characteristic of NATO SEASPARROW is the project's multi-
national nature. This partnership arrangement provides distinct
advantages which will be fully discussed in Chapter VI. Partnership
agreements, especially when the partners are active participants as
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opposed to being limited partners interested only in a dollar return on
investment, add a degree of complexity to any plan. Procedures must be
established which permit the partners to interact on the subject of
determining operational system configuration. Specifically, the plan
should provide a mechanism for the review of all proposed changes. The
review process should consider the actual necessity for the change, the
impact of the change on the system and the systems with which it inter-
faces, and cost and schedule implications, as well as other factors that
might be relevant. In certain cases where changes are not being imple-
mented on a system-wide basis, the review should also consider the
impact and implications of maintaining systems to a non-uniform
configuration.
It is common in configuration management that a change be approved
by an appropriate authority prior to implementation. The mechanism for
reviewand approval of proposed changes in the multinational environment
requires unanimity on the part of all member nations. This objective
is addressed to the most complex question in any configuration management
plan, the question of overall system authority and control, and is
designated objective three.
3. The plan shall provide a mechanism for the full review
and approval of all proposed changes.
E. PROCUREMENT AND INSTALLATION OF CHANGES
Given changes that have passed the review and approval processes,
procedures should be established to implement each change either
throughout the system or to nations participating in that specific
change. This objective relates primarily to the selection of an
organizational form, the interactions between customer and contrac jr,
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and the administration of change kit distribution and special technical
support. Formally stated, objective four is as follows:
4. The plan shall provide for the procurement and installation
of approved changes.
F. CONFORM TO UNITED STATES DIRECTIVES
In the NATO SEASPARROW Project, strict conformance with many key
United States Navy directives on configuration management has been the
rule since the inception of the project. Documents specifically cited
are Naval Material Command Instruction 4130.1, the document which sets
forth the criteria on which the prime contractor, Raytheon Company,
established its configuration management plan: MIL-STD-480 which
establishes procedures for handling ECP's, waivers, and deviations; and
MIL-STD-490 which details procedures for preparation of specifications.
It is appropriate that deviations from established United States
procedures be made when required by the nature of the system. In
summary objective five is:
5. The plan should conform to current United States Navy
and Department of Defense policies and procedures,
as agreed on by the member nations.
G. BUDGETARY CONSTRAINTS
The requirements of this sytem must adhere to established fiscal
constraints. The fiscal contraints will not only impact any proposed
change to the system but will also affect the nature and size of the
control and review organizational form sleeted. Fiscal constraints
also bound decisions concerning selection of appropriate organizations
to perform status accounting and audit functions.
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Consideration of this objective is intended to apply not only to
upper limit bounds on spending but also to the fiscal management policies
for the Configuration Management organization. Key areas for considera-
tion are (1) the method or formula for sharing of the costs for the
configuration management system as well as for the procurement of
specific changes, (2) the level and method by which changes will be
funded in advance, (3) the fiscal control area, i.e., the establishment
of specific dollar thresholds for authorized spending by elements of
the organization, and (4) a consideration of the balance of payments
policy with appropriate thresholds.
Summarizing, objective six is:
6. The plan must realistically adhere to cost and budgetary
constraints and must establish an effective configuration
management fiscal management policy.
H. PROVIDE FOR SUPPORT FUNCTIONS
The software support functions of Configuration Status Accounting
and Auditing are a cornerstone of configuration management. These
add visibility and provide the mechanism for management control of system
configuration. Provision for the installation of these functions are
essential in any configuration management plan. The organization and
procedures established must satisfactorily perform these support func-
tions whil remaining flexible enough to respond to the particular needs
of a multinational system. The corresponding objective follows:
7. The plan must adequately provide for the performance of




I. EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION-
The configuration management plan must provide for an effective method
for circulation of technical data and certain operational information
to include: (1) observed problem areas, (2) corrective actions taken,
(3) information on safety practices and hazardous situations, and (4)
information in designated operational areas.
A system which provides the nechanism for, and firmly advocates,
free communication between all member nations should (1) enhance the
ability of the system to correct deficiencies, (2) serve as an aid in
the implementation of changes, and (3) provide an initiative to
maintain system integrity. In summary, objective eight states:
8. The configuration management plan should provide
for effective exchange of technical operating
information.
J. ACCEPTABILITY
In any multinational endeavor, the consent and approval of each
partner is essential to the success of the system. Without the full
approval and support of each member nation, the integrity of the system
is subject to degradation and possible disuse.
This objective, given the basic assumption of joint participation in
some configuration management scheme, is perhaps the most important.
Without it, the most elaborate, well-prepared plan will fall short of
full success. In conclusion, objective nine is:
9. The general approach and details of the configuration
management plan must be acceptable to all member
nations.
The nine primary objectives stated have been structured to account
for actual constraints, the multinational nature of the system, and
46

fundamentally, the need of a complex weapons system for some form of
configuration management. The objectives are summarized in Table II.
47

Table II. Summary of Configuration Management Objectives
for the NATO SEASPARROW Surface Missile System
Operational Phase.
The configuration mangement plan shall:
1. Provide for implementation of approved changes on a
system-wide basis.
2. Be flexible enough to respond to differing situations
and implement changes efficiently.
3. Provide an effective control mechanism for the review
and approval of proposed changes.
4. Provide for the procurement and installation of
approved changes.
5. Conform to current policies and procedures, as
appropriate
6. a) Adhere to cost and budgetary constraints, and
b) Establish an effective configuration management
fiscal management policy.
7. Provide for the performance of the functions of
configuration status accounting and audit.
8. Provide for effective information exchanges.
9. Be acceptable to all member nations.
48

VI. ENUMERATION AND DISCUSSION OF SUB-ALTERNATIVES
AND CONSTRAINTS
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to enumerate and discuss in detail
the sub-sets of alternatives in the development of a configuration




• Change Control Measures
The range of alternatives and constraints presented have been developed
from historical information on other NATO projects, general information
on organizational forms, and the application of generally accepted
management principles.
Also presented are the various alternatives available for the
administrative functions of procurement and installation of changes and
configuration status accounting. These two administrative areas
represent basic plan implementation details fundamental to any configura-
tion management plan. While they must support the overall approach
synthesized from the sub-sets of alternatives above, they are virtually
independent and can be effectively individually optimized for inclusion
in the final alternative mix. These administrative alternatives have
been extracted from current configuration management procedures. The




The configuration audit function has been provided for in the pro-
duction contract which provides for the Defense Contract Administration
Service to conduct the First Article Configuration Inspection (FACI)
audit. No future requirements for system audits can be envisioned by
the authors at this time. Due to these circumstances, consideration of
alternatives for the audit function are not deemed necessary.
B. HISTORICAL INFORMATION ON ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
During the past fifteen years numerous multinational projects have
been sponsored by NATO. The organizational structures utilizing have
varied greatly among the projects. Four major projects, having differ-
ent organizational forms and authority relationships, will be examined.
The projects described will assist the reader in becoming familiar
with the multinational environment as well as assisting in establishing
the range, of alternatives available. The projects are:
t NATO Air Defense Gound Environment (NADGE) Project
• HAWK ground-to-air Missle
• STARFIGHTER all-purpose military aircraft
• SIDEWINDER air-to-air Missile
1. NADGE Project
The NADGE organization is an industrial consortium composed of
major sub-system contractors and headed by a United States company which
provided the management leadership. This industrial consortium was
matched with a government group having corresponding responsibilities
but not headed by a United States representative. Contracts were
made directly between the participating governments and the industrial
consortium. Under this arrangement each nation was able to tailor the
50

system it purchased to its own requirements. Each nation was further
responsible for obtaining logistic support for its own system
r • * A 34configuration.
2. HAWK Project
The HAWK Project had an organization with an industrial consortium
similar to the NADGE Project, but with no United States company in the
consortium. Instead, the NATO consortium contracted separately with a
United States company to supply the required technical resources to the
member companies. Again, as in NADGE, a counterpart government




The organization used for the production of the STARFIGHTER
aircraft did not involve the use of a multinational industrial
consortium. Four different groups of companies, one group in each of
the participating nations, were formed with each national group having
a separate contract with the United States licensor of the system. A
multinational governmental counterpart was established similar to the
NADGE and HAWK groups to coordinate the overall project. Each
country has subsequently developed its own maintenance and logistic
support facilities for the STARFIGHTER. 37
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In the case of SIDEWINDER, a single company in West Germany was
the prime contractor. This contractor received technical data and
managerial assistance from the United States licensor. The governments
of the consortium created a single management agency which contracted
38
for the consortium with the West German prime contractor. The prime
contractor obtained the contracts for repairing and supporting the
39
SIDEWINDER Missiles for all members of the consortium.
5. NATO SEASPARROW Project
While the NATO SEASPARROW Project has been unique from its
inception, in that all members of the consortium participated in the
design and development of the system as well as its production, the
project has pronounced similarities to the above mentioned systems as
it approaches its operational phase. These similarities are rooted in
the fact that each member nation will have achieved its primary goals
for joining the consortium once the system has been delivered. Each
member will have a sophisticated weapon system operational on its ships,
the foreign exchange cost will have been minimized, the technological
base of its industries will have been widened, and a standard set of
operational tactics developed. During the development and production
phases of the project, the configuration management organization was
not formally specified. It did, nowever, follow the overall management
structure of the project on an informal basis. Since, in the opinion







have been achieved, the need to continue using the originally agreed
upon management organization has greatly decreased. It is further
considered reasonable, at this point in the project life cycle, that a
new management organizational form may be adopted to meet the needs of
the operational phase without jeapordizing the original goals of the
member nations.
C. ORGANIZATIONAL FORM ALTERNATIVES
Based on the assumption in this thesis that a basic change in the
organization of the NATO SEASPARROW Project could not be ruled out
during the operational phase the following alternatives to the




This alternative provides for the continued use of the present
configuration management organization utilizing the NATO SEASPARROW
Project Steering Committee and the Nato SEASPARROW Project Office headed
by a project manager.
2. Single Management Group
This alternative reduces the number of management groups to one,
headed by the project manager, conducting direct liaison with both the
contractor and the respective governments.
3. Multiple Consortia
This alternative disbands the existing consortium in favor of
smaller multiple consortia oriented toward meeting the operational phase
needs of smaller groups of like-thinking nations with regard to
performance and logistic support.
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4. Disband the Consortium
This alternative provides for disbanding the existing consortium
in favor of each nation managing its own system and arranging for its
logistic support through the prime contractor and/or directly with the
sub-contractors as well as the prime contractor. Developing an alterna-
tive prime contractor in one or all of the member nations is not con-
sidered a economically viable alternative by the authors, due to the
complexity of the system and high tooling and technology transfer costs.
D. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES FOR ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
It is assumed that some modification of the organizational form of
the NATO SEASPARROW project can reasonably be expected as the system's
production phase is completed. The level of effort required for the
acquisition management functions will continually decrease from this
40
time. The magnitude and number of kay decisions which were handled
by the consortium through the steering committee/project office organiza-
tion will decrease, and the bulk of the management effort will focus
attention on engineering change proposals and details relating to
41delivery, acceptance, and logistic support.
Under organizational forms, the first alternative discussed is that
of status quo. The steering committee/project office structure would
remain. The obvious primary advantages are maintaining the viability of
a proven structure and eliminating the need for a considerable
reorganization effort. The manning levels and composition of both the
40
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project office and the steering committee could be modified downward in
the number and the rank of the staff to reflect the reduced tempo of
operations. The current organization is acceptable to all member nations
and has achieved considerable success in resolving difficult problems
42
in the project to date.
Given the relative simplicity of the system hardware (in the realm
of advanced weaponry), and with the relatively low number of anticipated
changes, this two-level organization may not be required to administer
43
the system. Maintaining this organization structure could result in
fairly trivial decision being resolved at a high level. This is con-
sidered by the authors to be not only time-consuming but costly. While
the steering committee meets only once eyery three months, and in fact
has met in full session only thirteen times since the inception of the
44
project in 1966, there are definite time and economic costs associated
with these meetings.
The second alternative eliminates one of the management echelons
referred to in alternative one. Basically, this alternative calls for
the removal of the steering committee from the configuration management
decision process. The responsibility and authority would be distributed
42
Interview with NATO SEASPARROW Project Office Staff and National
Representatives, Washington, D.C., March 1972.
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The budget estimate for changes for the first operational year is
only $800,000. This figure is considerably less than the amount
authorized for changes in the first year of Tartar program.
44
Interview with NATO SEASPARROW Project Office Staff and National
Representatives, Washington, D.C., March 1972.
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between the project office and a representative for each nation within
each functional replacement for that nation's steering committee and is
not to be confused with a national representative resident on the project
staff. Each representative would provide the principal liaison between
the project office and the functional material commands of each nation.
The function of a national representative physically located in the
project office is addressed in the concluding chapter.
Using the project office as the basis for a single level organization
has the distinct advantage of maintaining existing working relationships
to the greatest extent. The project office will be performing many
configuration management related functions prior to the installation of
a formalized plan. With the removal of the steering committee from the
configuration management decision process, control guidelines and
decision criteria would have to be restructured. In summary, the funda-
mental premise behind this alternative is that the project office would
receive the sanction of the participating nations to perform the
configuration management function for all NATO SEASPARROW systems
within specified limits.
The next two alternatives call for a disestablishment of the exist-
ing consortium. The first of these calls for the establishment of
multiple smaller consortia. This would permit the grouping together of
nations having similar objectives in the area of configuration management.
Nations having similar plans for making significant modifications and
continuing engineering efforts might form one consortium which could be
described as "performance-oriented." Others interested only in keeping
their system configurations operational and having effective support and
exchange of technical information could form a "logistics-oriented"
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consortium. The nature of the consortia formed would be a function of
the funding available, the emphasis on the threat and total defense
posture of each nation, the actions of other nations and their degree of
committment, and the state-of-the-art.
The simplest application of this alternative would be the formation
45
of a European consortium, of "logistics-oriented" nations to maintain
existing lines of logistics support, while the United States, represent-
ing a "performance-oriented" nation, would establish new sources of
logistic support for changes and modifications not supported by the
original manufacturer. This arrangement would permit a separation of
those nations interested in supporting an existing configuration and
those having the objective of continuing to improve the system through
development efforts.
It is not the intent of this approach to foster the formation of
vast numbers of individual or overlapping consortia but rather to group
together the nations with nearly congruent system philosophies to allow
each member nation to better meet its needs and to maximize its
configuration management benefits. Much of the overall control of the
system could be lost in the exercise of this alternative but many of
the benefits of mutual support would remain.
In the final alternative, each nation would be responsible for
arranging its own logistic support. The configuration management func-
tion would be performed for United States systems in accordance with
current Department of Defense directives. It is likely that change kits
45




and drawings would be made available to system owners on a cash sale
basis and that the Naval Ship Missile System Engineering Station could,
on a contract or similar basis, maintain the status of the configuration
of foreign systems.
This alternative has advantages for both the United States and the
other nations. There would be no outside factors to be considered when
making decisions on future configuration changes. The United States
would be entirely free to modify the system as per its own desires. This
configuration freedom would be common to all system owners. Other
nations could purchase the changes they desired from the United States,
if they were made available, and would be free to determine their system
configuration.
This alternative is not unlike former NATO projects where a buyer-
47
seller relationship existed. The overall configuration management of
all NATO SEASPARROW systems taken as an entity would be significantly
reduced. The cost to all participants would be greater. The United
States would bear the full cost of the development of a change if no
other nation purchased it. For other nations, the logistics cost would
increase due to their inability to pool all parts with the United States
Even those nations participating in an informal configuration management
effort through the purchase of kits and drawings would experience some
difficulty in maintaining continuity. In the past, not all changes have
been made available to. foreign system owners and gaps created in
46
Interview with NAVORD personnel attached to Naval Ship Missile
System Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, California, May 1972.
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documentation have significantly reduced the effectiveness of this method
of configuration management. It is not suprising that a nation is
reluctant to implement a change when it cannot evaluate the full impact
that change may have on its systems. This is often the case under the
existing "buyer-seller" relations which exist in weapon systems sold by
the United States to other nations. Often, for various reasons, some
changes are not made available to these customer nations. The result is
gaps in the number sequence of changes. Technical personnel question
the effect of the "missing" changes on new changes being offered for
48implementation.
Information on technical problems is not shared on a system-wide
basis. The motivation to maintain system configuration, submit reports,
and exchange useful information is substantially less than in a formal
organization with more rigid configuration control.
The advantages and disadvantages of the preceding alternatives on
organizational form are summarized in Table III.
E. AUTHORITY CONSTRAINTS
The configuration management organization form selected and the
49
extent of authority vested in that form are closely related. The
extent of authority vested in any organization plays a large part in
determining the effectiveness of that organization. The management
principals of delegation of authority and extraction of responsibility
commensurate with the authority delegated hold true for multinational
48
Interview with NAVORD personnel attached to Naval Ship Missile
System Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, California, May 1972.
49Cleland, David I. and King, William R. , Systems Analysis an
Project Management
,
p. 6, McGraw-Hill, New York, New York, 1968.
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Table HI. Organizational Form Alternatives - Advantages
and Disadvantages.
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
ALTERNATIVE 1 - Continue Present Dual Management Group Organization
Proven Structure o
Reorganization Not Required •




Trivial Decisions moved to
High Levels
Slow to Respond at High Level
High Cost to Keep Both Groups
ALTERNATIVE 2 - Consolidate to One Management Group.
• Restructure Guidelines
t Restructure Decision Criteria
t Some Reorganization Required
Reduced Manpower Requirements
Maintain Relationships
P.O. Famil. with additional
Duties
Potential of Rapid Response
on Higher Level
ALTERNATIVE 3 - Disband Existing Consortium in Favor of Smaller
Multiple Consortia.
• Permit Grouping of "Like-
Thinking" Nations on CM
• Preserve Mutual Support




Much Overall System Control
Lost
More Costly Than Single
Consortium due to Duplication
of Effort
High Reorganization Cost
ALTERNATIVE 4 Disband Existing Consortium, Each Nation Provide
Its Own Logistic Support.
Maximum Configuration
Freedom
Services of Various U.S.
Navy Agencies Available to
Other Nations
Low Management Cost
• Pro! iteration of Configura-
tions
• High Support Cost
• Difficult to Exchange
Information




organizations just as for any other management organization. However,
it is the opinion of the authors that the decision on how the authority
is to be limited becomes much more complicated when the number of
"bosses" management must report to increases from one to six as in the
case of the NATO SEASPARROW project.
The basic question of authority limitation is the degree to which a
participating nation will let an international group manage the config-
uration of its operational system. In a multinational endeavor, the
various users may have significantly different attitudes on modifying
the configuration of their operational systems, even though their o
objectives in establishing the initial system configuration were
identical. The individual nations may not share the ideal that uniform
system configuration and rigid central configuration control throughout
the consortium are consistent with their own objectives. This would be
especially true if change cost considerations did not appear to the
participating nations to yield corresponding improvements.
With these considerations in mind, it is reasonable to assume that
the member nations will insist upon the limitation of the configuration
management authority vested in the configuration management organization
The constraints presented here in the broad category of authority
limitation measures may be used individually or in combination to
achieve the desired authority limitations for the appropriate
organizational form.
1 . Cost Constraints
Cost limitations may be sub-divided into two categories: cost
per individual change and cost per time period. Exceeding a particular
cost boundary in the case of a proposed change would place the appr /al
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decision at a higher level of authority, or perhaps to further review
and vote by all participating nations.
2. Area of Impact Constraints
The area in which a change impacts such as cost, performance,
schedule, or interface, may serve as a method of limiting configuration
management authority.
3. Components of Sub-Systems Constraints
Components or sub-systems affected by the change may be utilized
as a limiting factor. This method would allow some components to be
subject to lesser configuration control than others.
Specific alternatives consisting of a mix of the three limiting
constraints presented here will not be developed in this chapter but
will be included in the synthesis of the overall alternatives in the
following chapter.
F. DISCUSSION OF AUTHORITY CONSTRAINTS
These constraints primarily address the question of the extent of
the ability of the organizational form selected to change the system.
This first constraint, cost, is the most straight-forward. By agree-
ment of the consortium, cost limitations could be established on a per
change or per year basis. Within this boundary, a control organization,
for example the project office, could unilaterally implement a change
throughout the system. These cost limitations would, determine the
nature of changes to be made by the control organization(s) . At one
extreme, if the consortium desired to severely limit the ability of the
project office to make changes, the monetary ceilings would be placed
at a few hundred dollars unit cost per change per system or a giver
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number of thousands of dollars per system per year. This would restrict
the project office to the most basic engineering "fixes" to correct pro-
duction discrepancies. Examples of the type of change envisioned here
are, replacement of minor components or software changes to update
maintenance procedures or technical manuals. With a higher dollar
ceiling, the project office would have the flexibility to continue more
expansive engineering efforts which could result in the replacement of,
or modification to, major sub-systems. A representative example might
be a launcher modification which would enable the system to fire another
missile or a modification to the missile to counteract an enemy
countermeasure.
The impact of a proposed change could also be used to regulate the
authority of the controlling organization. A proposed change which
would require the removal of operational systems from a ready status
for a prolonged period of time or produce significant interface changes
with related systems might be examples of impact boundaries which would
cause decisions to be moved to higher authority levels or to a vote
situation. The consortium might conclude that any change which modified
the actual performance specifications of the missile be referred to all
participants.
The final area which could be used to limit authority would be a
hardware breakdown of sub-systems authroized, or not authorized, for
change modifications.. For technical or support reasons, power supplies
or switchboards might be placed outside the change authority.
It is likely that the authority to make changes would be limited to




• Changes to the overall system might be dollar limited
(cost)
.
t A restriction on removing systems for prolonged periods
from operational use (an area of impact-operational
schedule)
.
t A restriction on modification to the Launcher
(sub-system).
It is conceivable that a change could be bounded in all major constraint
areas.
The preceeding constraints for limitations of authority with the
advantages and disadvantages of each are summarized in Table IV.
G. ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE CONTROL MEASURES
The basic right to exercise authority and to implement decisions in
a consortium comes from the agreement (Memorandum of Understanding)
between the member nations when the consortium is formed. Additional
guidelines and procedures, supplemental to this basic agreement, must
be developed to ensure that changes which have been reviewed and
approved are implemented throughout the system. While total control
of change is a principal purpose of configuration management, in this
section we refer specifically to the implementation of those changes
which have been formally approved and those which have been formally
rejected by the configuration management organization.
The difficulty in developing agreements among the member nations is
significant on the question of what measure should be utilized to
motivate some future dissenting member to conform to the decision of the
configuration management authority. While each nation is cognizant of
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the benefits of maintaining a uniform configuration, or of deviating
from the uniform configuration in only a manner approved by the
configuration management authority, it tends to be hesitant in approving
harsh sanctions which may be used against it.
The question of dissent can be split into two areas. First, are
those nations that desire a change which the others do not want (Case I)
and, second, those that do not want a change which the majority wants
(Case II). Therefore, the alternatives must be presented in two groups,
those aimed at motivating individual nations to avoid unilateral changes
and those designed to encourage dissenting members to accept a change
desired by the majority.
The alternatives presented here are restricted to the logistic
support area, as it is this area which is of greatest concern to the
nations during the operational phase of the project and it is in this
area that the configuration management organization will play the
greatest role.
1 . Case I Alternatives
The alternatives for motivating an individual nation to avoid
unilateral change, are:
a. Accept Right to Vary Configuration
The consortium would, under this alternative, accept the
right of the dissenting member to make unilateral changes regardless
of the effects this has on the other members. Under this option the
consortium may provide logistic support for the non-standard configura-




b. Reject Right to Vary Configuration
The consortium would, under this alternative, reject the
concept that each nation can make the final decision on its own con-
figuration. Under this alternative any nation deviating from the
standard without the approval of the consortium would be subject to
losing some or all of the logistic benefits provided by the consortium.
2. Case II Alternatives
There are three alternatives designed to motivate a dissenting
member to accept a change desired by the others, Case II. The first
two have an element of motivation, while the third accepts the dissent.
The three alternatives are oriented toward the area of logistic support
and are:
a. Formal Approval
Under this alternative the project office would support
through the NATO SEASPARROW configuration management organization only
those changes which have been formally approved by the configuration
management authority.
b. Advanced Funding
This alernative would require a sinking fund or other monetary
advance to the configuration management control organization by all
participants from which all approved changes would be funded.
c. Support all Configurations
Under this alternative the consortium would accept the right
of the individual participant to reject the change and would provide
Igoistic support for different configurations.
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H. DISCUSSION OF ALTERNATIVES FOR CHANGE CONTROL MEASURES
It may be extremely difficult to arrive at an ironclad policy to
control the implementation of changes. It is more likely that a policy
would be developed including elements of all three alternatives which
could be applied on a case basis. Such a policy should not be viewed
as a mechanism for consuring those not conforming to approved
configurations.
The first alternative, to support only approved configurations, does
imply a removal of support for non-approved configurations. For practical
reasons, this is not likely to occur. In cases of differing configura-
tions, where the former configuration was not being maintained by the
configuration management organization, existing stocks of components
could be furnished the dissenter. On an as-available basis, the
configuration management organization could support the dissenter. The
emphasis, however, would be placed on maintaining approved configurations.
The responsibility for the support of a non-approved configuration would
rest with the system owner.
The requiring of a "changes fund" in which all member nations
participate may have validity in its own right without using it as a
motivating factor to implement change. To be used as a motivating factor
any change approved by the consortium would be funded by each nation,
according to a predetermined cost-sharing formula, whether it actually
decided to install the change or not. Since most changes are to improve
performance or reliability it would be highly unlikely for a nation to
fail to install such a change once it was funded. It would be possible
to remove the motivation aspect, by drawing from the fund only for
those nations implementing the change.
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In the last alternative, the configuration management organization
would recognize the need to support the participants' system, regard-
less of their configuration status. While this alternative would provide
the maximum degree of freedom to the respective nations, it would
severely degrade the authority behind decisions of the configuration
management organization.
The preceeding change control measure alternatives with their
advantages and disadvantages are summarized in Table V.
I. PROCUREMENT AND INSTALLATION OF CHANGES
The procurement and installation of changes involves furnishing
plans, instructions, and material for the accomplishment of changes to
the NATO SEASPARROW equipments in service or in stock for use as repair
parts. This is restricted to the procurement of the necessary parts,
documentation to make up the kits, and the distribution of the kits to
the installing activity. It does not involve the actual design of the
change kits to be provided.
1 . Alternatives
The alternatives for providing this effort are:
a. Utilize Existing NAVORD Organization
Under this alternative the project would utilize the existing
NAVORD Surface Missile System Ordnance Alteration organization. This
organization is established by NAVORD Instruction 8000.6 of 24 Jan 1968.
This instruction tasks the Naval Ship. Missile Systems Engineering Station
(NSMSES) and Naval Ammunition Depot (NAD), Crane, with the task of
providing ordnance alternation kits (ORDALTS) for the Navy's surface
missile systems. Contracts would be let as necessary to procure it' is
not available through normal supply channels.
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Table V. Change Control Measure Alternative - Advantages
and Disadvantages.
ADVANTAGES DISADVANTAGES
CASE I - AVOIDANCE OF UNILATERAL CHANGE
ALTERNATIVE 1 - Accept Right to Change, Provide Varying Degree of
Support.
§ Provide Flexability t Allows Proliferation of
Configurations
t Commonalty of parts quickly lost
§ Motivates members to purchase
not Desired Changes
ALTERNATIVE 2 - Reject Right to Change, Provide Varying Degrees
of Support Loss.
• Provide Strong Motivation § A Clearly Negative Attitude
for Conformaty
§ Doe$ ^ promote Future
Cooperation
CASE II - PROMOTION OF ACCEPTANCE OF A APPROVED CHANGE
ALTERNATIVE 1 - Provide Support For Only Duly Approved Configurations
t Allows Desenter to Use-Up • May Cause "Drop-Outs" From
Existing Stocks of "Old" The Consortium
parts.
t Desenter may "Catch Up" His
System by Installing Oianges
Later
ALTERNATIVE 2 - Require Sinking Fund for Changes
• Insures Funding of Changes • Difficult to Gain- Agreement
• Provides Strong Motivation on Site of Fund
for Installation of changes • Adds Substantial Cost to
to System
ALTERNATIVE 3 - Provide Support for all Configurations.
• All Nations Assured of • Potentially Spiraling Suppor




b. Contract to Prime Contractor
Under this alternative the project would contract with the
prime contractor to assemble and distribute the change kits as well as
design the kits.
c. Contract to Separate Contractor
This alternative provides for the project to contract with
a separate firm to coordinate the preparation and distribution of the
kits. For example, Vitro Corporation provides such a service for
various NAVORD organizational components.
d. Perform Within Project
Under this alternative the project would establish an organ
organization within the NATO SEASPARROW configuration management
organization to perform the procurement and installation of change
functions.
J. CONFIGURATION STATUS ACCOUNTING ALTERNATIVES
The function of configuration status accounting involves recording
the data which identifies Engineering Change Proposals (ECP's) and their
approval and implementation status.
The configuration status accounting effort with NAVORD for the Surface
Missile System (SMS) program is established by NAVORD Instruction
4130.1 of 5 March 1968. This instruction provides for Naval Ship Missile
Systems Engineering Station to collect, record and process surface
missile systems engineering change data and prepare listings for both
United States and foreign applicability.
The Strategic Systems Project Alterations (SPALT) program provides
the policies, controls and procedures for configuration control an
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configuration status accounting for the Fleet Ballistic Missile system
is a multinational program involving the United States and the United
Kingdom.
The configuration status accounting for the Strategic Systems Project
Alternations program, together with all the associated computer and
reporting software is provided by an independent software firm. The
Strategic Systems Project Alteration program is, due to the nature of
its application, a very sophisticated status accounting system.
1 . Alternatives
The alternatives for the performance of the configuration status
accounting functions are:
a. Utilize Existing NAVORD Organization
This alternative provides for the project to utilize the
existing configuration status accounting organization established by
NAVORD.
b. Contract to Software Firm
Under this alternative a contract would be made with an
independent software company as was done for the Strategic Systems
Project Alterations program.
c. Perform Within Project
This alternative provides for the project to develop a
configuration status accounting organization within the SEASPARROW
project.
K. CONCLUSION
The sets of sub-alternatives presented in this chapter have included
representative approaches to each of the major equestions addressee"
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While each of the sub-alternatives have been discussed and their
advantages and disadvantages enumerated, no attempt has been made to
evaluate them. This has been done deliverately to avoid the possibility
of sub-optimization at the expense of the system solution. In Chapter
VII three system configuration management approaches are developed with
a mix of sub-alternatives and limitation criteria which can be utilized
together to form a comprehensive solution.
Table VI summarizes the sets of sub-alternatives and criteria
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VII. DEVELOPMENT -OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM APPROACHES
AND SELECTION OF RECOMMENDED APPROACH
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter combines different organizational forms, authority
constraints, and implementation measures into three system approaches
to the configuration management plan for the operational phase of NATO
SEASPARROW, each developed by the authors to satisfy the objectives of
Chapter V. Each system approach is synthesized from the elements
mentioned in the preceding chapter and is then discussed on its own
merits. The system alternatives are compared relative to one another
and a selection of a recommended approach is made.
The three alternatives are designed to cover principal courses of
action available to the consortium. The first alternative relates to
the situation where the existing organizational form is maintained, and
the member nations strictly control the allocation of funds to the
configuration management effort. The second alternative treats the
case of a single management group, the project office, with a greater
degree of centralized configuration control. The final alternative
addresses the situation of minimal centralized configuration control
and disestablishment of the steering committee. This last alternative
approaches the buyer-seller relationship discussed earler as being present
in other NATO projects, but retains a greater degree of interaction
between participants. The number and degree of changes is assumed to
be the same, regardless of the alternative selected; i.e., the
alternative with a more complex organizational form and more rigid
controls will not cause an increase in the number of changes.
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B. ALTERNATIVE ONE - MAINTAIN CURRENT ORGANIZATIONAL FORM
This alternative maintains the steering committee and its relation-
ship with the project office. The steering committee would continue to
meet on a regular basis and would directly address the issues of
configuration management policy and logistic support.
This organizational form has in the past proved quite satisfactory.
The current project manager and the national representatives on the pro-
ject staff interviewed in March, 1972 stated that the organization
worked well and that there was a continuing high degree of cooperation.
Rather than establish a new organizational structure by eliminating
the steering committee it might be wise to make use of the established
good working relationships and lines of communication.
Continuing the development of this alternative, in the area of
authority constraints on the project office, it is assumed that the
steering committee would establish a relatively low ceiling on project
office spending without specific authorization of the steering
committee. Any change within the project office's spending level
which would impact system performance, schedule, or sub-system inter-
faces to any significant degree would require review and approval of
the steering committee. Criteria for degree of significance of pro-
posed changes would be developed by the steering committee for use by
the project office. The steering committee would determine the
feasibility of maintaining differing configurations and closely control
configuration of the entire system. Members not desiring to make a
change or desiring to pursue a separate path through a series of changes
would be supported on a not-to-interfere basis, with primary
consideration given to configurations approved by the steering comi ttee,
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The expression "not-to-interfere basis" refers to actions that the
authors assume the project office could take in behalf of nations with
non-approved configurations. These actions include arranging for
support of earlier configurations and arranging for transfer of
components made obsolete in one system, to a system owner maintaining
an earlier configuration.
This alternative retains a large amount of control at the steering
committee level. While it is envisioned that changes would be funded
by participants in advance, only the more trivial changes or changes
specifically designated by the steering committee would be implemented
by the project office. A rigid configuration control policy is assumed;
one which would maintain a uniform configuration to the greatest possible
degree and, when necessary, carefully control differing configurations.
This rigid policy should yield benefits for all participants,
especially in the.area of logistic support. This alternative should be
conducive to good information exchange of technical and non-technical
data since the organizational form requires continuing interaction
between the member nations.
It is assumed that this control organization would implement
mutually agreeable changes meeting the criteria for change justifica-
tion as specified in MIL-STD-480 which, briefly stated, is to make
changes which correct deficiencies, effect substantial life cycle cost
savings, or make significant improvements in the system's effectiveness.
C. ALTERNATIVE TWO - CENTRALIZE CONFIGURATION CONTROL IN PROJECT OFFICE
The second alternative eliminates the two level organization of the
steering committee and the project office, and places the responsi! lity
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for configuration management primarily with the project office. The
consortium would remove the steering committee from the configuration
management decision process after discussing the details of configura-
tion management plan implementation. Liaison with each participating
nation would be made through a designated representative in each
functional material command. The steering committee would again become
involved in a future modernization effort requiring a large increase
in expenditures and a new contract. It is assumed that this alterna-
tive, through the elimination of an entire echelon of authority,
would increase the flexibility of the organization and increase the
ability of the organization to implement changes in an expeditious
manner.
The expenditure constraints envisioned for the project office are
substantially more liberal than those of alternative one. The project
office would receive its initial guidance from the steering committee.
The project office would have the authority to review, approve, and
implement all changes consistent with the policy established by the
steering committee. It is assumed that this policy would provide for
affecting all changes necessary to maintain the system in current
operational status and make improvements as practical within cost
constraints. It is further assumed that such a policy would preclude
the project office from directing any major re-design or re-engineering
effort which exceeded the established ceiling funding level. This
alternative again assumes advance funding of change costs on an
annual basis. The formula for cost-sharing and the details for admin-
istering the changes would be discussed and agreed upon by the steering
committee prior to its removal.
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With the centralization of change authority it would be essential
that the project manager ensure that each member nation was kept
informed on the status of changes.
In the area of impact constraints, the project office would be
restricted from authorizing or procurring changes which caused significant
increases in operating cost or removal of the system from operational
status for a prolonged period of time. Once again the degree of
significance of a change would be specified by the steering committee.
The steering committee might further see fit to limit changes specifically
on certain components or sub-systems.
This second alternative provides for rigid configuration control
and active participation by member nations. The benefits of rigid
control should again be available to all participants. As in alternative
one, the project office would assist those nations with differing, non-
approved configurations, in maintaining adequate logistic support on
a not- to- interfere basis.
D. ALTERNATIVE THREE - MINIMAL CENTRALIZED CONTROL WITH A SINGLE LEVEL
ORGANIZATION
The final alternative assumes a single level organizational form
composed of the project office, as in alternative two. In this alterna-
tive no firm configuration management policy is established prior to the
dissolution of the steering committee, with the exception that the
nations agree to continue to exchange data and participate actively in
maintaining system configuration.
A major difference between this alternative and the previous two
is the lack of advance funding of changes. This lack of advance fund-
ing, it is assumed, would seriously reduce the ability of the
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organization to control and implement change on a system-wide basis.
What is envisioned here is a return, to some degree, to the buyer-seller
relationship of other NATO projects. It would differ from this rela-
tionship in that the consortium would be maintained to permit particip-
ants to continue their interaction with the project office on the subject
of change and to facilitate the transfer of technical and non-technical
data. This method permits the nations to interact with the change
authority prior to procurring and implementing the change. The project
office would coordinate engineering change proposals. This permits an
understanding of the reason for the change and an appreciation of the
effects of maintaining differing configurations. It places the res-
ponsibility on the project office to solicit all member nations on each
proposed change or group of proposed changes and requires each individual
nation to respond, positively or negatively, to the solicitation. When
the solicitation is completed, the change could then be procurred.
This alternative significantly reduces the flexibility of the organiza-
tion and inhibits its ability to implement changes expeditiously on a
system-wide basis. The ability of the organization to control system
configuration would be greatly reduced.
This alternative does, however, have some positive points. If
implemented, the level of interaction of nations on proposed changes
and technical data would be substantially higher than the current system
50
of direct sale of change kits to system owners. It would allow sharing
of costs related to a specific change or group of changes.
50
Interview with NAVORD personnel attached to Naval Ship Missil
System Engineering Station, Port Hueneme, California, May 1972.
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As in the previous alternatives, it is assumed that the project
office would assist in the coordination of logistic support of non-
approved configurations on a not-to-interfere basis. The essential
elements of these alternatives are summarized in Table VII.
E. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES
The ability of each of the preceding alternatives to attain the
objectives for the configuration management plan outlined in Chapter V
will be discussed.
It is felt that both alternatives one and two, the single and double
level organization, satisfy the first objective to maintain control of
system configuration. It is not felt that the organizational form is
as critical a factor as the method for funding changes. In both
alternatives one and two, changes are advance funded at some level
according to predetermined policy. The disposition of these funds is
also agreed upon. The major difference between the first two alterna-
tives lies in the degree of centralization of control over the changes
fund. In alternative three, where each nation must respond to the
subsequently fund each desired change, it is felt that control over
system configuration would be, at best, marginal
.
Under the objective of configuration management organization
flexibility, alternative two is deemed the most desirable. It is
assumed that the flexibility of the organization and the efficiency
with which changes are implemented is a function of centralization
of control. Control in alternative two is highly centralized in the form
of the project office. In alternative one, control is some what dispersed,











































































































































































































































































































































increases the likelihood that administrative delays in change implemen-
tation would occur. Alternative three is a widely decentralized
organization, with each member nation reviewing and weighing the impact
of each change or group of changes prior to participating. It is
reasonable to assume that, given the increased number of administrative
interactions that would occur per change and the requirement to confer
in advance with each nation on proposed changes, the efficiency and
flexibility of alternative three is far less than that of alternative
two or one.
The third major objective requires an effective review and approval
mechanism. It is felt that while alternative two may nandle review
and approval somewhat more efficiently than alternative one, both
alternatives can attain the objective to a high degree. It should be
noted that the question addressed here is review and approval on a
system-wide basis. The word review is used here in a broad sense and is
not limited to the technical review by an engineering group. Both
alternatives one and two would have established procedures for review
and approval of proposed changes leading to implementation. Alternative
three's mechanism for review and approval is splintered and diverse.
The approval of a change is indicated by a nation's willingness to
implement that change. It is felt that unanimous approval or disapproval
would probably be the rule in alternatives one and two, while in
alternative three delays and the substantially more complicated
administration process of individual soliciation and response would
seriously hamper accord on any proposed change.
The details relating to the initial procurement and installation of
approved changes can be administered equally well by all three alte native
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forms. Simply, this is because the project office and its functions in
this particular area are common to all three alternatives. This object-
ive refers specifically to the procurement and distribution of approved
change materials and is regarded as an essential part of the configura-
tion management plan. Similarly, the next two objectives; conformance
to policy and directives, and adherence to budgetary constraints can
be met by all three alternatives. The conformance to policy refers
primarily to MIL-STD-480, the document which established procedures
for engineering change proposals. This military standard has been used
consistently since the inception of the project and no deviation from
the details contained therein is seen in any of the three forms, in
the area of cost constraints each alternative form is viable. The
costs of maintaining the steering committee active in alternative one
for configuration management decision making may set this alternative
at a greater cost than the other two, but this cost is not felt to be
significant.
In the discussion of the next two objectives, the alternatives are
similarly grouped. It is felt alternatives one and two will be sub-
stantially more effective than alternative three, in the support
functions of configuration status accounting and operational configura-
tion audit (if held), as well as for the exchange of technical and non-
technical data. Alternatives one and two do not have the dispersion of
configuration management control of alternative three. In both alterna-
tives one and two there is an established configuration management
policy fully formulated and funded in advance. It is assumed that the
more rigid organizational procedures which serve to approve and implement
change will also enhance the support functions and information exci nge.
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The last major objective, and one of the most important, refers to
the acceptability of the planned approach. The authors have approached
this objective from the standpoint that member nations may be reluctant
to accept a plan requiring an extensive level of continuing participa-
tion and funding. The most acceptable alternative by this criterion
is seen as number three. This alternative provides the mechanism
whereby a nation can participate in an individual change, or an
interrelated series of changes, if it desires to do so without any
prior committment. Further, each nation would have complete flex-
ibility to determine its own system configurations. There would be no
advance funding requirement and payment would be required only for
those changes actually procurred.
Alternatives one and two are viewed as less acceptable because of
the requirement to fund changes for some period in advance and to accept
the change control authority of the steering committee or the project
office.
A summary listing of these alternatives with each objective is
given in Table VIII. This table compares the alternatives and reflects
the degree to which the authors feel the alternatives satisfy the
objectives of the plan.
F. SELECTION OF RECOMMENDED ALTERNATIVE
While it does represent an improvement over the current system of
distributing changes to other nations and does have a number of positive
factors in the crucial acceptability area, the authors have eliminated
alternative three for the following reasons:
85

Table VIII. Summary of Evaluation of System Alternatives
OBJECTIVES





















































• the plan would not take advantage of the spirit of
cooperation and cohesiveness of the current project.
• the plan is particularly weak in the control and
implementation of change areas
• the funding and procuring of approved changes is
for less efficient than alternatives one or two.
Alternatives one and two have many similarities. Both can
effectively maintain control of system configuration through their
fairly rigid organization forms and the advance funding of changes on a
yearly basis. Both alternatives envision satisfactory review and
approval mechanisms. In the areas of conforming to current policies,
budgetary constraints, status accounting, and exchange of data, their
capabilities are similar.
The fundamental difference between alternatives one and two is in
the organizational form and the distribution of authority over that
form. In alternative one the authority is vested primarily in the
steering committee, while in alternative two the project office has
full authority for mangement of system configuration within specified
boundaries. Based on the level of anticipated changes for the NATO
SEASPARROW for the first year (less than $1.0 Million), 51 it is felt
that the type and number of changes is such that it is well within the
capability of the project office to administer. Further, assuming a
decreasing number of changes in following years the need for an active
steering committee seems questionable. Neither the cost or degree of
change appears, in the opinion of the authors, to warrant the active
51





participation of the steering committee in configuration management.
It is felt, however, that full active participation of all member n
nations should be continued to maintain effective system configurations
and to provide for appropriate logistic support. Keeping these
considerations in mind, alternative two is the approach recommended
by the authors. The details relating to the implementation of this





The recommended configuration management approach has been defined
in broad terms in the previous chapter. In this chapter the specific
organizational structure, relationships, and responsibilities necessary
to implement the recommended approach are presented. The format used
is similar to the configuration management plan for surface missile
systems as prepared by the Naval Ship Missile Systems Engineering
Station at Port Hueneme, California. The format has been modified to
accomodate the multinational nature of the NATO SEASPARROW Surface
Missile System and to reflect the time span the configuration manage-
ment plan is intended to cover, i.e., from the delivery of the first
production system through the completion of the system's life cycle.
B. ORGANIZATION
The proposed removal of the NATO SEASPARROW Project Steering
Committee from the configuration management decision making process
calls for a restructuring of the project management authority relation-
ships. Under this organizational form, the project office is directly
responsible to the national governments of the consortium for configura-
tion management. Figure 5 depicts the authority relationships envisioned
by the authors for the. operational phase configuration management
organization. Due to the relatively small size of the NATO SEASPARROW
Project, when compared to other major acquisition projects involving
substantially greater cost, it is considered feasible by the authors
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organizational units are required. The functions to be performed by
each organizational unit are listed within the "box" representing that
organizational unit on the organizational chart.
As illustrated in Figure 5, the project office derives its authority
from the nations of the consortium and is responsible solely to those
nations. The implementation of this organizational form can be
accomplished through the execution of a new memorandum of understanding
to cover the operational phase. The new memorandum should either
deactivate the NATO SEASPARROW Project Steering Committee or diminish
their role in the configuration management decision process until some
future time when it may be required again, such as to manage a major
modernization of the NATO SEASPARROW system. It is also felt by the
authors that the new memorandum should restructure the project office
by broadening its commitment authority sufficiently for it to perform
its configuration management mission efficiently and effectively and to
remove it from a production-oriented management environment to an
operational and maintenance oriented management environment. It is
further believed that this could be accomplished by assigning national
representatives from the functional material commands which have primary
interest in maintenance and operations instead of production. The flow
of a engineering change proposal through the review process is
illustrated in Figure 6.
C. RESPONSIBILITIES
The configuration management responsibilities of the organizational
units and the roles each assumes, as envisioned by the authors, are



















































































































Each member of the consortium would be responsible for assigning
a capable national representative to the project office from its func-
tional material command to represent its interest in the project or to
52
arrange, by separate agreement, for some other nation to represent it.
The individual nations are responsible for establishing and maintaining
a NATO SEASPARROW information center for the dissemination of informa-
tion from the project office or its agents to the users and for the
collection of feedback information to be transmitted to the project
office, its agents, and the other nations. They should also provide a
channel within their respective functional material commands for the
consideration of configuration management questions which are beyond the
authority constraints of the project office. Finally, each nation will
be responsible for complying with the fiscal obligations decided upon
by the steering committee prior to its removal from the configuration
management decision process.
2. Project Manager
The project manager will be responsible for the establishment of
the configuration management organization, the operation of the project
office and its relationship with the other configuration management
organizational units. He will establish configuration management policy
for the project office within the framework provided in the new Memorandum
of Understanding. The project manager will exercise control over all
change actions involving project funds.
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Such an arrangement now exists in the project office where the




The project manager would also serve as the chariman of the NATO
SEASPARROW Configuration Control Board. The national representative
would sit as members of the configuration control board for the purpose
of evaluating and taking final approval action on all engineering change
proposals within their authority to approve. Engineering changes beyond
the scope of the NATO SEASPARROW Configuration Control Board's authority
would be forwarded to the material commands of the respective nations
with the comments and recommendations of the board. In addition, it
would be the responsibility of the board to notify the functional
material commands of each nation of any system interface problem arising
from the board's actions and for recommending remedies to be taken by
the member nations to correct those interface problems.
3. Configuration Manager
The configuration manager is envisioned by the authors as the
full time configuration management team member in the project office.
He will perform the combined functions of configuration manager and
configuration management agent with the exception of being chairman of
the configuration control board, a function performed by the project
manager.
In the role of configuration manager he would be responsible for
making recommendations for the approval or disapproval of engineering
change proposals to the configuration control board and for providing
the secretariat service for the configuration control board. The
secretariat assures the smooth flow of engineering change proposals
from inception through final approval and implementation or disapproval.
It would also be the responsibility of the configuration manager to
accept configuration audits for new systems and change kits.
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In the role of configuration management agent he would be
responsible for the preparation of change review packages and the
administration of implementation of configuration control board approved
changes. He would also be responsible for developing special purpose
configuration management plans for unique situations arising in the
project and for coordinating the configuration status accounting effort.
He furnishes information to supporting agencies such as the Naval Ship
Missile System Engineering Station for logistic and engineering support
purposes.
4. Defense Contract Administration Service
During the development and production phases of the NATO SEASPARROW
Surface Missile System, the Defense Contract Administration Service has
served as the contract administrator for the project. Since the pro-
duction contract has a substantial time to run and will be administered by
the administration service until completion, it is recommended that they
also administer the operational phase engineering support contract
discussed later in this section.
The configuration management responsibilities of the Defense
Contract Administration Service include interpreting the configuration
management contract requirements for the contractor and ascertaining if
the requirements are being met. They represent the project office
during configuration audits, inspections, reviews, and acceptance trials,
as well as the monitoring of the contractor's configuration accounting
system to assure the tracking and accomplishment of approved changes.
Finally, they coordinate the submission of contractor originated
engineering change proposals and submit comments and recommendations




The configuration management requirements are normally negotiated
and written into the production contract. In the case of the NATO
SEASPARROW Project the production contract provided for configuration
management only through the end of production.
It is recommended that a separate contract for continued support
engineering be negotiated with the prime contractor for the operational
phase. The responsibilities of the contractor should include the sus-
taining engineering effort required to support the NATO SEASPARROW
system throughout the operational phase. This effort should include the
continued search for improvements by the prime and subcontractors, the
preparation of engineering change proposals for those improvments, and
the corrective engineering required to correct problems or failures
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encountered by the operational user.
6. Naval Ship Missile System Engineering Station
The Naval Ship Missile System Engineering Station at Port Hueneme,
California is the configuration status accouting agent for United States
Navy surface missile systems and is uniquely qualified for handling the
configuration status accounting function for the NATO SEASPARROW Surface
Missile System. The Naval Ship Missile Systems Engineering Station
would be responsible for coordinating through the national representa-
tives the collection of the status of change implementation on each
installed system including all components in stock as spare parts as
well as on any other equipments affecting the status accounting operation.
53
An existing system for reporting equipment problems and failures
on a multinational project is the Fleet Ballistic Missile Weapon S; stem
Trouble and Failure Report Program, Strategic Systems Project Off"; 3
Instruction 3100. 1C, 1 May 1969.
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On a periodic basis Naval Ship Missile Systems Engineering Station
would be responsible for issuing summary data on each system to all
member nations. It would be responsible, together with the Naval
Ammunition Depot, Crane, for the procurement, assembly, and issuance
of change kits to the respective nations. Figure 7 shows the organization
of the Naval Ship Missile Systems Engineering Station.
D. CONCLUSIONS
The above implementation plan is a recommended approach to be used
for the preparation, evaluation and installation of, and accounting for
engineering changes during the operational phase of the NATO SEASPARROW
Project.
In addition to the configuration management plan used within the
system, it is most likely that each nation will have some form of formal
configuration control apparatus of its own. It is envisioned that some
countries, including the United States, will insist upon reviewing some
if not all of the engineering change proposals through their existing
organizations. Such reviews may somewhat delay the decision process
but cannot be anything but helpful to the NATO SEASPARROW Project
Configuration Control Board in providing a greater insight into the


































ACQUISITION PHASE, the period between the end of the definition phase
and the delivery of the last equipment to the customer.
ALLOCATED BASELINE, an allocated configuration identification which is
an optional baseline initially approved by the customer
AUDIT, to inspect records and procedures.
BASELINE, an approved reference point for control of future changes to
a product's performance, construction, and design. Mainly
specifications and drawings.
BASELINE MANAGEMENT, developing and administrating the necessary charac-
teristics of a Navy material item at designated points in its life
cycle through the use of configuration identification and engineering
control
.
CHANGE, within the context of configuration control, a formally recognized
revision to a specified and documented Navy material requirement.
Includes design changes, engineering changes, field changes,
technical change orders, changes in specifications or other related
requirements - type documents, waivers, deviations, alterations,
amendments, improvement, modifications, and other similar types of
change actions.
CHANGE CONTROL BOARD, the same as configuration control board.
CHANGE IDENTIFICATION NUMBER, a number assigned to a data package defin-
ing an equipment engineering change. It is used to control, sequ-
ence, and account for production, implementation, and retrofit
actions related to the change. The CIN includes the CI number,
company code identification number, ECP number, ECP type code,
ECP revision code, and ECP correction code.
CLASS I CHANGE, a change affecting the contract specification, price,
weight, delivery schedule, reliability, performance, interchange-
ability, interface with other products, safety, RFI , or GSE.
CLASS II CHANGE, any change not falling within the Class I change
definition given above.
COMPONENT, a part, subassembly, assembly, or combination of these items
joined together to perform a function.
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DOCUMENT, the collective term for specifications, drawings, parts lists,
standards, and report.
ENGINEERING CHANGE PROPOSAL (ECP), a document that proposes change to a
Navy material item in accordance with applicable bulletins, regula-
tions, standards, and other directives. Includes design change
proposals, engineering change proposals, proposed engineering orders,
proposed field changes, proposed change orders, value engineering
change proposals, requests for waivers and deviations, alteration
improvement proposals, material improvement proposals, and other
similar modification proposals, change-type documents.
ENGINEERING DATA, specifications, drawings, parts and wire lists.
EQUIPMENT, an item designed and built to perform a specific function as
a self-contained unit or to perform a function in conjunction with
other units. It is the same as a product.
FIRST ARTICLE CONFIGURATION INSPECTION, a formal review of the as-built
configuration of an equipment against its documentation to establish
the product configuration baseline for the CI. Formal approval of
Phase II of the detail specification occurs during FACI.
FORM, FIT, AND FUNCTION, the physical and functional characteristics of
a CI as an entity, but not covering characteristics of the elements
making up th^ CI.
FUNCTIONAL BASELINE, the functional configuration identification
initially approved by the customer. (See FCI.)
GENERAL OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT (GOR), a document which describes a
long term (5 years) operational need or characteristic for a
weapon system.
INTERFACE, a common boundary between two or more items. This boundary
may be electrical, mechanical, functional, or contractual.
KIT, a collection of carefully identified and controlled items used to
build a module, printed circuit board, subassembly, or assembly
Kit items are usually kept in a plastic box or plastic bag and
labeled.
LIFE CYCLE, the period covering the design, development, manufacture,
operation, maintenance, logistics support, and repair of an
equipment.
MODIFICATION, a change to an equipment and spares allowed only after
the contract has been revised.
OPERATIONAL, applies to actual use of a product.
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PERFORMANCE, the functional or operating characteristics of an equipment;
for example, measurement range, accuracy, stability, linearity,
and reliability.
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS, quantitative and qualitative material descrip-
tions of an item; for example, form, fit, dimensions, finishes, and
composition. Tolerances for each characteristic are also given.
PHYSICAL CONFIGURATION AUDIT, a formal examination of the as-built con-
figuration of an equipment against its documentation to establish
the initial product configuration identification.
PRIVATELY DEVELOPED ITEM, an item completely developed at the company's
expense and offered to the customer as a production item. Customer
control of the configuration is usually restricted to the item's
form, fit, and function.
PRODUCT BASELINE, the product configuration identification initially
approved by the customer.
PRODUCT CONFIGURATION BASELINE, a CI baseline defined by an approved
Part II of the detailed equipment specification, which is established
by completion of FACI.
PRODUCTION BASELINE, a company baseline that precedes the customer
product baseline.
SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT (SOR), a document which describes
operational or performance characteristics needed to fulfill a
near-term operational requirement for a system.
SPECIFICATION, a document, primarily used for procurement (purchase of
an item from a vendor or subcontractor), that describes the major
technical requirements for an item and the procedure for determining
the requirements have been met. Key sources of specifications are
the Federal Government, the military, and industry.
SPECIFICATION TREE, a drawing showing the indentured relationships
among specifications independent of the assembly or install ati
c
relationships of the items specified. The tree shows the dependency
of specifications on other specifications.
STANDARD, a document designed for recurring use. It specifies engineer-
ing and technical limitations and applications for an item, process,
or engineering practice. A standard gives general requirements and
does not describe how something shall be done. Key types of
standards are federal, military, and industrial.
SUBASSEMBLY, two or more parts that form a portion of an assembly




SUBCONTRACTOR, one who performs a subtask for the company that has the
equipment contract.
SUBSYSTEM, a major functional subassembly or group of items that is
essential to operational completeness of a system.
SUPPORT EQUIPMENT, equipment required to make the CI operational in its
intended environment; for example, ground equipment or computer
programs.
SYSTEM, a composite of subsystems, assemblies (or sets), skills, and
techniques capable of performing and/or supporting an operational
(or non-operational) role. A complete system includes related
facilities, items, material, services, and personnel required for
its operation to the degree that it can be considered a self-
sufficient item in its intended operational (or non-operational)
and/or support environment.
FUNCTIONAL AREA, a distinct group of system performance require-
ments which, together with all such groupings, forms the
next lower level breakdown of the system on the basis of
.
function.
SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, the application of scientific and engineering
efforts to (a) transform an operational need into a description of
system performance.
SYSTEM SPECIFICATION, a general specification containing technical and
mission requirements for the system as a whole and apportioning
these requirements to subsystems or equipments for meeting mission
goals. It also defines interfaces between the different items.
TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN, a complete description of the effort required
to fulfill a need, including identification of high risk areas,
functional diagrams, equipment configuration, gross solutions to
system requirements, and funding schedules.
TECHNICAL MANUAL, a type of technical order which contains instructions
designed to meet the needs of personnel engaged in operating,
maintaining, servicing, overhauling, installing, or inspecting
the equipment.
TENTATIVE SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT (TSOR) , a preliminary specific
operational requirement.
TRACEABILITY, the ability to determine the origin and date of manufacture
of a part assembled into a product or to determine which serial
numbered product contains a part from an identifiable lot.
TRADE-OFF, an evaluation of a design change to determine its importance
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